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Securitization, Hedge Funds and Private Equity: Systemic Risks in Organizational Financing 
 
Chi Zhang1  
 
Introduction 
Ever since the credit crisis occurred in 2007 in the US, the lawsuits and settlements are taking 
place continuously, most of which were in relation to the use of alternative investment tools in 
financial market. The systemic risks2 of securitization and hedge funds have drawn enough 
attention of scholars and lawmakers, meanwhile, with the promulgation of the US’s Dodd-Frank 
Act in 2010, the authorities are also regulating private equity funds more strictly to mitigate the 
systemic risks of LBOs. In this essay, the author will compare the possibility of systemic risks in 
above types of alternative investment vehicles from an organizational law perspective.  
 
1. Securitization: commercial trust model 
Generally speaking, the securitization has been widely used in financial market in US for the 
purpose of diversifying the risks of illiquid assets from commercial banks to other institutional 
investors. The core legal mechanism of securitization is the ‘bankruptcy remoteness’ which is 
realized by transferring the financial assets to an independent entity, commonly is called ‘special 
purpose vehicle (SPV)’ in return for payment by holding the trust certificates. Meanwhile, SPV 
issues trust certificates to other investors in public markets. The interests of securitization are 
expected by the repayment from original debtors.  
 
Compared with corporation, securitization does not only provide more stable residual claimant to 
their members but also more flexible funds for further investment3, in other words, the owners of 
commercial banks can be sure that SPV’s assets will not be traced by the creditors. At the same 
time, the payment of the assets will provide originators with more capital to make further interests 
by lending, and banks will also retain a portion of subordinate trust certificates in expectation of 
receiving cash flow from the assets in SPV. Therefore, banks have motivation to lend more money 
to the borrowers including those one whose credit record cannot provide sufficient and stable 
guaranty to the lending.4  
 
Because of ‘trustees’, actually in most cases, the investment banks or securities brokers commit to 
provide higher return to public investors, therefore, like pension funds, hedge funds and insurance 
companies quite prefer the securitization. Moreover, in order to upgrade the rating of securitized 
assets, the ‘trustee’ would use some external warranty measurements like credit default swap 
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(CDS) or governmental guaranties to hedge the default risks.5  
 
All the participants in securitization trusts would concern more with the securities or certificates 
they are holding than the substantial industries they are investing to, like real estate market and the 
actual solvency of individual credit card debtors6. As a consequence, when the debtors fail to 
repay their loans, all the investors would be impacted seriously, in other words, the systemic crisis 
will be triggered. Above facts has happened in US since 2007, to a large extent, the organizational 
structure of securitization may give us some explanations.  
 
Firstly, the ‘true sale’ rule in trust law removes those bad loans and long-term debt from the 
balance sheet of commercial banks, which means that the banks can gain cash back with less risk. 
By contrast, traditional civil trusts are commonly used to be a form of ‘gift’ for the benefit of a 
third party, which means that the motivation of the settlers is relatively prudential and more likely 
to impose strict fiduciary duty on trustees by trust deed.7 However, in terms of securitization, 
although originators also hold a portion of trust certificates, nevertheless, the fundamental purpose 
of it is to strip the loans away from themselves, so the motivation of settlers has been changed 
from ‘preserving the value for third parties’ into ‘transferring the risks to third parties’. To a large 
extent, securitization trusts are used to speculate diversify loan risks, by which the banks would 
not pay more trade cost on bargaining with the trustees when they sell their packed loans to an 
SPV. 
 
Secondly, the incentive of the ‘trustee’ in securitization is getting higher management fees. 
Generally, the amount of fees depends on how much certificates would be sold to investors, 
therefore, the managers of securitization are prone to have strong motivation to apply a set of 
structured derivatives with high-rate interest or complicated collaterals which can enhance the 
credit of the certificates to attract investors. According to the basic principles of trust law, trustees 
should be responsible for the security of the assets and manage or dispose the trust assets by 
themselves prudently and carefully. 8 However, the nature of the highly structured financing 
means that the trustees are removing their fiduciary duty to other financial institutions, such as 
insurance companies, although SPV still ‘owns’ the securitized assets. Therefore, if we admit that 
the organizational structure of securitization is a kind of commercial trust, we should apply the 
basic principles of trust law, namely the rules of ‘prudent investor’ and ‘fiduciary duty’, both of 
which require and expect trustees to manage, use, and assign the trust assets with adequate duty of 
care.9  
 
Thirdly, if we apply trusts principles to regulate securitization, we should also consider why other 
types of commercial trusts, such as mutual funds (or unit trusts), have not generated so serious 
systematic problems. From the perspective of organizational law, the differences between them are: 
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1) the beneficiary of mutual fund is sole, therefore, fund managers should invest prudently only on 
behalf of unitholders, whereas the manager of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) 
assumes the fiduciary duties for two different parties. Precisely speaking, the ‘trustee’ is expected 
to utilize financial derivatives to sell out more securitization certificates for commercial banks, 
meanwhile, as the trustee of public investors, the manager should also be responsible for due 
diligent investigation of the underlying loans and be sure that the quality of underlying assets is 
safe and acceptable for investors 2) mutual fund managers must subscribe a portion of units of the 
fund they are managing, which better avoids the moral hazard of fund management than 
securitization.10  
 
As a result, securitization only use the trust model to diversify risks, but the trustees or managers 
do not create the value of underlying assets, neither for banks nor institutional investors. In 
addition, the incentive system for trustees only focuses on the management or underwriting fees 
from investors, which is hardly to motivate trustees to pay attention to the substantial quality of 
the financial assets. Finally, the lack of fiduciary duty triggers the systemic financial disaster in 
US.  
 
2. Hedge Funds: a passive limited partnership model  
Since the crisis took place, hedge funds have been talked frequently together with private equity 
funds and securitization.11 As a type of alternative investment vehicles, hedge fund is well-known 
for the use of complicated derivatives and hedging strategies, like short/long position. However, 
until now it is not easy to find out an accurate legal definition of hedge fund.12 According to a 
series of existing literatures, hedge fund may be characterized by following features: 1) its legal 
nature is a type of pooled assets which can be invested to various securities, derivatives and even 
commodities and currencies; 2) the offers can only be privately issued to qualified institutional or 
individual investors; 3) the investors are entitled to redeem their investment periodically, the 
practice of which is commonly restricted by the certain contractual provisions; 4) the profit of 
fund managers is mainly based on the performance of the fund, namely the carried interest and 
finally 5) hedge funds are mostly formed as limited partnership or offshore LLC for purpose of tax 
avoidance.13  
 
In terms of systemic risks, hedge funds are considered as an serious threat to the stability of 
financial market.14 Compared with mutual funds in US, hedge funds can be regarded as a kind of 
‘private securities investment fund’ that makes profit by using complicated mathematic models to 
predict the losses or profit of a set of certain securities and make mass financial speculation on the 
basis of their predictions. However, until now there has been no completely reliable and accurate 
mathematic model can predict all the risk in the market, the inherent risk and vulnerability of 
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hedge fund is still existing. Moreover, the extensive use of short/long transactions in a short period 
of time will influence the market prices considerably, thus, the unregulated hedge funds can 
impose serious threat to the whole market.15  
 
From a legal perspective, although the organizational structure of hedge funds is almost the same 
as private equity (PE) funds, however, the two significant distinctions make hedge fund much 
riskier: the one is that since hedge fund is open-ended, the redemption pressure will be existing 
through all the process of fund management.16 Once any unpredicted event happens, such as the 
crash of housing market since 2006 in the US, investors will redeem their cash from the fund 
simultaneously. In this scenario, fund managers may sell out or even undersell securities in bulk to 
get adequate cash to refund to investors, which may exacerbate the price volatility in public 
market and mislead public investors. The other factor making hedge funds much riskier is the 
excessive use of leverage. In order to maximize the profit, fund managers are likely to borrow 
great deal of cash from banks which is secured by the total value of the investor’s capital in the 
fund.17 In this case, if the prediction of the market trends is turn out to be false, the losses would 
be magnified by the leverage remarkably, and even all the investment would be used to repay the 
debt.18  
 
According to above analysis, if we define the ‘actual control, management or reduction of risk’ is 
a kind of ‘positive’ strategy, hedge fund is likely to be categorized as a type of ‘passive’ business 
organization, because its speculative investment is mainly based on a series of calculative 
judgement or macro-economic statistics, instead of the substantial participation in any 
value-increasing activities. Although the limited partnership structure is expected to impose more 
strict liability upon general partners (GPs) of the limited partnership enterprise to make the 
investment prudent, however, as most managers can easily be protected under limited liability by 
forming an investment entity, the legal nature and original function of GP, to a large extent, have 
been diminished by risky financial speculation.  
 
3. Private Equity: a positive limited partnership model 
As above discussed, individuals’ high leveraged consumption and the lack of responsibility of the 
material quality of the loans by financial institutions were the root causes of the credit crisis, 
which could be obviously seen through the legal structure of securitization and the operational 
strategies of hedge funds. Accordingly, due to the high-level debt financing, leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) and PE has been swept into regulators’ view. However, to what extent PE industry will 
give rise to systemic crisis is still a question need to be examined.19  
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First of all, private equity industry is usually formed as limited partnership, the PE firm partners 
must also hold shares of portfolio companies, which means that the manager of PE firm will have 
strong motivation to concern the quality of the enterprise and participate in management to 
increase the equity value. Compared with securitization, the fundamental interests of PE 
manager20 is ‘carried interest’, not only the management fees, therefore, PE manager would 
closely and diligently monitor the conduct of the boards and help the board increase the value of 
share.21 This can explain why securitization is more prone to spread the risks: the managers of 
SPV can only use additional guaranty to enhance the ‘credit’, instead of increasing the value of the 
investee assets; in other words, no matter how complex the derivatives would be, once the default 
of underlying debts take place, securitization can do nothing but transfer the losses to CDS 
providers, for instance, and insurance companies or other financial derivative holders.22 In this 
regard, PE funds can be deemed as an ‘positive’ alternative investment tools, whose investment 
strategies aims at materially increasing enterprises’ value.  
 
Secondly, in quite a large number of LBOs, the director(s) are likely to be the controlling 
shareholders in portfolio firms. Although we admit the phenomenon that the managers would 
divest inefficient assets to repay the leverage, which is likely to damage the long-term 
development of target companies, however, for the considerations of the sales are mostly adequate 
to cover the debt and interest, the chain of default risk would be cut off by divestitures. In this 
context, the systemic risk may not be as serious as securitization.  
 
Thirdly, compared with hedge funds, PE fund is also considered as much safer. The most striking 
problem to be widely condemned is the excessive leverage ratio of the investee company, which 
can lead the investee company into serious financial distress. However, we should know that the 
‘leverage’ in hedge fund and PE fund is different, for the former, the leverage is used by the whole 
fund, which means that all investors’ capital all mortgaged to gain great deal of loans for the 
purpose of magnifying the profit. By contrast, the term ‘leveraged buyout’ is referred to the 
following capital structure, the acquiring firm (GPs) uses a small amount of cash combined with a 
large deal of capital from limited partners (LPs) to buyout a company, but the buyout fund itself is 
not likely to use leverage.23 As a result, even though the restructuring of the target company fails, 
the losses are not as serious as hedge funds, at least the LPs’ cash will not be used to repay the 
additional leverage.  
 
Moreover, LPs’ capital will be locked in the fund for a longer period of time, differing from the 
open-ended funds like hedge funds. Because of the investors in close-ended fund have less 
freedom to adjust their investment, LPs will have strong motivation to carry out due diligence 
investigation prior to investing. This internal motivation will reduce the potential risk at the 
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inception of a certain PE project. Furthermore, close-ended fund is less impacted by sudden events 
like Madoff scandal, which means that the managers do not have to undersell the securities 
emergently to meet investors’ redemption demands. In respect of financial stability, because PE 
funds invest only to those securities that do not dealt in public market and the total amount of fund 
capital is relatively much more stable, the possibility of triggering price volatility is not serious in 
PE industry.   
 
However, the most possibility of systemic risk in PE industry is that if commercial banks are 
playing the role as LPs in PE, the lenders will have strong desire to use credit derivatives to 
transfer their risks in PE fund to public market for the purpose of getting their capital return and 
meet the compulsory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in banking laws and the Basel Accords, which 
may spread credit risks from private into public again24. Even so, it can be seen that systemic risk 
in relation to PE transaction is not caused the organization itself, but the relationship between PE 
firms and lenders.25 
 
Concluding Remarks  
The financial recession that we have been going through was triggered by excessive debt 
consumption in the US society and the lack of responsibilities for the underlying debts in financial 
market. The Parliament’s over-lax monetary policy overly stimulated the mortgage loan market, 
which drove the commercial banks to find a way to diversify the serious risks. From the view of 
finance, the root cause of credit crisis is the over liquidity between financial institutions, which 
eventually stimulated the use of alternative investment tools including securitization, hedge funds 
and private equity. However, the regulatory responses to the three business organizations should 
be distinctive.  
 
In respect of organizational analysis, the nature of securitization is a kind of financial trust, whose 
functions are transferring the debt to institutional trustees and getting consideration by selling the 
beneficiary certificates to public investors. The reason why investment bankers used so many 
kinds of financial derivatives in securitization is that the inherent conflicts of interest between 
public investors and originators can only be covered up or mitigated by using complicated 
guaranty agreements or other legal techniques. Finally, to some extent, the ‘independent assets’ 
and ‘true sale’ principles of trust law not only exacerbated the lack of responsibility of underlying 
debts but also distorted the credit system. 
 
Hedge funds’ risk exposure is largely based on its speculative strategies in financial market, in 
other words, the profitability of hedge funds relies on the statistical analysis or macro prediction of 
certain securities or economy, however, any measurement of statistics cannot guarantee the 
absolute accuracy for investment practices, the high risk feature makes hedge fund managers have 
to provide more liquidity to investors, as a result, redemption right and over-speculative 
participation in securities markets involves hedge funds into the plight of systemic risk.  
 
                                                        
24 Financial Service Authority (FSA), Private Equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory engagement (2006) 
(DP06/6). 
25 Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks, and Henri Servaes, ‘Private Equity: boom or bust?’ (2007) 19 (4) Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 44.  
By contrast, the legal structure and incentive system of private equity funds would keep the 
ownership of portfolio company still in the hands of actual managers, which means that the risks 
and profitability of PE can be controlled and finally, exit strategies by PE investors usually are 
able to cut off the chain of bankruptcy risks. Eventually, to analyze the causes of systemic risks in 
financial market should be associated with each organizational business respectively, for example, 
even though leverage is ‘harmful’, however, the performance of it varies from different business 
organizations. Whether an investment vehicle will give rise to systemic risk is mostly determined 
by its internal investment style and which market it would invest in, both of which finally 
determined the specific legal mechanisms within each of them.  
